Continuation #3 of the veto message
By documents submitted to congress at the present session, it appears that on
the first of January, 1832, of the twenty-eight millions of private stock in
the corporation, $8,405,500 were held by foreigners, mostly of Great
Britain, the amount of stock held in the nine Western and Southwestern
States is $140,200, and in the four Southern States is about $13,522,000.
The profits of the bank in 1831, as shown in the statement to Congress, were
about $3,455,598; of this there accrued in the nine Western States about
$1,640,048; in the four Southern States about $352,507, and in the middle
and Eastern States $1,463,041. As little stock is held in the West, it is
obvious that the debt of the people in that section to the bank is
principally a debt to the Eastern and foreign stockholders; that the
interest they pay upon it is carried into the Eastern States and into
Europe, and that it is a burden upon their industry and a drain of their
currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and occasional
distress.
To meet this burden and equalize the exchange operations of the
bank, the amount of specie drawn from those States through its branches
within the last two years, as shown by its official reports, was about
$6,000,000.
More than half a million of this amount does not stop in the
Eastern States, but passes on to Europe to pay the dividends of the foreign
stockholder. In the principle of taxation recognized by this act the
Western States find no adequate compensation for this perpetual burden on
their industry and drain of their currency.
The branch bank at Mobile made
last year $95,140, yet under the provisions of this act the State of Alabama
can raise no revenue from these profitable operations, because not a share
of the stock is held by any of her citizens.
Mississippi and Missouri are in
the same condition in relation to the branches at Natchez and St. Louis, and
such, in a greater or less degree, is the condition of every Western State.
The tendency of the plan of taxation which this act proposes will be to
place the whole United States in the same relation to foreign countries,
which the the Western States now bear to the Eastern. When by a tax on
resident stockholders the stock of this bank is made worth 10 to 15 per cent
more to foreigners than to residents,most of it will inevitably leave the
Country.
Thus will this provision in its pacticable effect deprive the Eastern as
well as the Southern and Western States of the means of raising revenue from
the extension of business and great profits of this institution. It will
make the American people debtors to aliens in nearly the whole amount due
this bank, and send across the Atlantic from two to five millions of specie
every year to pay the bank dividends.
In another of its bearings this provision is fraught with danger; of the
twenty-five directors of this bank five are chosen by the Government and
twenty by the citizen, stockholders. From all voice in the elections the
foreign stockholders are excluded by the charter. In proportion , therefore,
as the stock is transferred to foreign holders the extent of suffrage in the
choice of directors is curtailed. Already, there is almost a third of the stock in
foreign hands
and not represented in elections. It is constantly passing out of the
country, and this act will accelerate its departure.
The entire control of
the institution would necessarily fall into the hands of a few citizen
stockholders,
and the ease with which the object would be accomplished would be a
temptation to designing men to secure that control in their own hands by
monopolizing the remaining stock. There is danger that a president and
directors would then be able to elect themselves from year to year, and
without responsibility or control manage the whole concerns of the bank
during the existence of its charter.
It is easy to conceive that great evils
to our country and its institutions might flow from such a concentration of
power in the hands of a few irresponsible to the people.
Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that in its
nature has so little to bind it to our country?
The president of the bank
has told us that most of the State banks exist by its forbearance. Should
its influence become concentrated, as it may under the operation of such an
act as this, in the hands of the self- elected directory, whose interests are
identified with those of foreign stockholders, will there not be cause to
tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the independence of
our country in war?
Their power would be great whenever they might choose to
exert it; but, if this monopoly were regularly renewed every fifteen or
twenty years on terms proposed by themselves, they might seldom in peace put
forth their strength to influence elections or control the affairs of the
nation. But, if any private citizen or public functionary should interpose to
curtail its powers or prevent a renewal of its privileges, it can not be
doubted that he would be made to feel its influence.
Should the stock of the bank principally pass into the hands of the subjects
of a foreign country, and We should unfortunately become involved in a war
with that country, what would be our condition?
Of the course, which be
pursued by a bank almost wholly-owned by the subjects of a foreign power,
and managed by those interests, if not affections, would run in the same
direction, there can be no doubt. All its operations, within, would be in aid
of the hostile fleets and armies without.
Controlling our currency,
receiving our public moneys, and holding thousands of our citizens in
dependence; it would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and
military power of the enemy.
If We must have a bank with private stockholders, every consideration of
sound policy, and every impulse of American feeling, admonishes that it should
be purely American. Its stockholders should be composed exclusively of our
own citizens, who at least ought to be friendly to our Government and
willing to support it in times of difficulty and danger. So abundant is
domestic capital that competition in subscribing for the stock of local
banks has recently led almost to riots.
To a bank exclusively of American
stockholders, possessing the powers and privileges granted by this act,
subscriptions for $200,000,000 could be readily obtained. Instead of sending
abroad the stock of the bank, in which the Government must deposit its funds,
and on which it must rely to sustain its credit in times of emergency, it
would rather seem to be expedient to prohibit its sale to aliens under
penalty of absolute forfeiture.
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality, in
all its features, ought to be considered settled by precedent and by the decision
of the supreme court.
To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is
a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding
questions of Constitutional power, except where the acquiesence of the people,
and the States, can be considered as well settled.
So far from this being the
case on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on
precedent.
One Congress in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another in
1811, decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank; in
1816, decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the
precedents drawn from that source were equal.
If We resort to the States,
the expressions of legislative, judicial, and executive opinions, against the
bank, have been probably to those in its favor as 4 to 1. There is nothing in
precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh
in favor of the act before me.
If the opinion of the supreme court covered the whole ground of this act, it
ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Government. The
Congress, the Executive, and the court must, each for itself, be guided by its
own opinion of the Constitution.
Each Public Officer who takes an oath to
support the Constitution swears that he will support it, as he understands
it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the
house of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to decide upon
the Constitutionality of any bill or resolution, which may be presented to
them for passage or approval, as it is of the supreme judges, when it may be
brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The
authority of the supreme court must not, therefore, be permitted to control
the Congress. or the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities,
but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.